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Abstract 
 
After a brief presentation of Feynman diagrams, we criticizise the idea that 
Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual 
physical processes. We then show that the best interpretation of the role they play 
in quantum field theory and quantum electrodynamics is captured by Hughes' 
Denotation, Deduction and Interpretation theory of models (DDI), where 
“models” are to be interpreted as inferential, non-representational devices 
constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the paper is to discuss the alleged representational role of Feynman diagrams (FDs) in 
the context of quantum field theory and in particular in quantum electrodynamics. 
Physicists working in particle physics use FDs to calculate the outcomes of interactions between 
particles. However, it is still debated whether FDs are only a convenient tool to help the calculations or 
have instead a representational role of some kind. In the latter hypothesis, one could claim, for 
example, that they are pictorial representations of physical processes involving interactions between 
charged particles.3 The problem with this claim is that in the context of quantum field theory and 
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quantum electrodynamics, FDs seem to play only an algorithmic role. More precisely, while it is true 
that there is a sense in which FDs help to visualize what is going on during an interaction between 
charged particles, they do so only in a heuristic way. Our conclusion will therefore be that FDs are just 
important tools to simplify the calculations and we will defend this claim by adopting Hughes’s theory 
of scientific models (Hughes 1997).  
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we will briefly illustrate the formalism 
of FDs and explain why certain of their features can lead to the mistaken belief that they can act as a 
pictorial representation of physical processes occurring in spacetime. We will also stress the aspect of 
the formalism that instead points toward an instrumentalistic account of the role of FDs. In the third 
section, we will briefly sketch the main problems encountered by the claim that FDs are pictures of the 
physical processes that they model. This criticism presupposes a general, albeit very sketchy account of 
what counts for a “pictorial representation”. Clearly, an answer to the question “do FDs represent 
pictorially?” is going to depend on such an account. While taking for granted that pictures, like 
“games” in Wittgenstein’s view (1953), cannot be exactly defined, we will suggest that spatio-temporal 
intuitions in the sense of Kant are the main characteristics of pictorial representations. In the fourth 
section, we will explain why, for the main purpose of the paper, framing the role of FDs in the context 
of a theory of scientific models originally proposed by Hughes (1997) seems a very plausible move. 
Finally we will mention in passing how this interpretation is reinforced by another account of models 
that is defended, for instance, by Suárez (2004) and van Fraassen (2008). In conclusion, the main claim 
of the paper is that the advantage of replacing the vaguer term “representation” with “model” does not 
consist in the fact that there is more philosophical agreement on what a model is (see Frigg and 
Hartmann 2016). Rather, it lies in the facts that (i) in the shared practice of physicists, models (FDs 
included) are regarded as algorithmic devises, thereby bolstering the account proposed here; (ii) the 
dispute between the friends and foes of the claim that FDs are pictures may be motivated by the merely 
contingent and psychological fact that physicists ─ among them the main creators of quantum 
electrodynamics (from now onward QED), Feynman and Dyson ─ rely on two different styles of 
scientific thinking. 
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2. Feynman Diagrams from A to B4 
 
In order to pose the problem of the representational power of FDs, we need to sketch in a 
qualitative, brief but as-precise-as-possible way, the role that they have in quantum field theory. FDs 
were originally proposed by Richard Feynman (1949a, 1949b) to describe and calculate processes of 
interaction and scattering in the specific context of QED. Quantum electrodynamics is a quantum field 
theory that describes the fundamental interactions between photons and charged fermions in terms of 
scattering and bound-state processes. As is well known, QED describes the interactions between two 
quantized fields: the electromagnetic field (the Maxwell field) and the electron-positron field (the Dirac 
field). 
In order to consider interactions in the context of quantum field theory, one has to formulate a 
perturbation theory by splitting the Lagrangian that describes the quantum field in two parts: the free 
part, that refers to non-interacting particles, and the interaction part, that refers to interactions. The 
formal tool that enables to calculate the interactions starting from an initial free state |IN> to a final 
free state |OUT>, is the S-matrix. It is important to note that both the initial and final free states are 
definable only in the limit of time going to infinity. That is, the |IN> and |OUT> states describe the 
physical world only when t → ± ∞. In evaluating the question that we are after, we ought not to forget 
the presence of this evident idealization. The calculation of the S-matrix expansion is often very 
difficult and the FDs have the fundamental role to make it simpler.  
Accordingly, already Dyson (1948) considered the FDs as a set of diagrams with the relevant 
rules of calculations that have the aim to compute matrix elements for scattering processes. In the 
context of quantum electrodynamics, Dyson himself provided a formal derivation of the FDs for an 
initial (and final) state of a charged particle in a process in which there are no photons: each term in the 
matrix element can be associated to a graph such that there is a one to one correspondence between 
types of matrix elements and graphs. The combination of these two ingredients yields a FD.5 
                                                            
4 The title of this section echoes that of Geroch’s book Relativity from A to B, Chicago, 1978. 
5 In the secondary literature, this algorithmic role of the FDs has been stressed by Kaiser (2000, 61), who claims that FDs 
are nothing but “conventional representational schemes with no pretentions to picturing actual particles' real scattering”. 
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3. Are Feynman Diagrams pictures? 
 
In order to argue in favor of the claim that FDs are only a convenient formal tool to calculate the 
expansion of the S-matrix in virtue of their correspondence with matrix elements, we should first of all 
consider the arguments that may lead one to believe that FDs represent in a pictorial way. A general 
account of what counts for “pictorial representation” can be suggested by the way the typical FD is 
used, in particular if one considers that the FDs are usually drawn in a plane, where the horizontal axis 
represents space and the vertical axis represents time.6 Moreover, FDs represent fermions with straight 
lines and bosons with wavy lines (FIG.1). 
Additional, prima facie evidence for the claim that the FDs represent scattering processes 
pictorially is reinforced by the fact that (i) each fermionic line preserves its spatiotemporal orientation, 
which represents whether it is at the origin of the interaction or its result and that (ii) basic interactions 
are represented by a vertex, which is defined as the conjunction of at least three lines. These three lines 
stand for two fermionic particles and a bosonic particle, which represents the minimal interaction 
among the former. To each vertex, also suggesting a pictorial image, is associated a coupling constant 
that characterizes the interaction – for example, the electric charge in the context of QED. It is worth 
noting here that the idea of a coupling constant seems also to suggest the claim that in this context one 
is representing a law of nature, while the products of interactions might be regarded as events in 
spacetime. To conclude this brief description of the notion of vertex, it is important to remember that at 
each vertex the relativistic stress-energy tensor is conserved.  
As a rough and ready general characterization of what counts for a pictorial representation, we 
will assume that the pictorial nature of any representational vehicle depends on the possibility to regard 
its target as a local matter of fact or as a local process that takes place in spacetime. For instance, a 
particular instance of this aspect of pictorial representations is the preservation of angles between the 
image of the vehicle and that of the target, as it occurs in the case of maps, photographs and “faithful” 
hand-made portraits. Also caricatures belong more or less to this class, where similarity can come in 
degrees.  
Even if this criterion is too strict, we can use it as a first stab toward a more general 
characterization, which was implicit in the reference to space and time at the beginning of this 
                                                            
6 Some physics textbooks prefer the opposite convention, and represent time with the horizontal axis and space with the 
vertical axis. 
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paragraph. A pictorial representation in fact is grounded in the possibility of visualizing local processes 
or matters of facts thanks to what Kant called the pure a priori forms of our intuition of all possible 
phenomena, namely space and time. As we will see below, this element of visualizability is very 
relevant to explain the uncontroversial role played by the FDs in learning and in understanding the 
theory following the paradigmatic example of Minkowski’s diagrams (Kaiser 2000). This pedagogical 
element is very plausibly grounded in our a priori “cognitive structure”, as one could reformulate – in a 
partially faithful way – the above-mentioned principles of Kant’s transcendental aesthetic. Such a 
structure is what led Schrödinger – in the wake of the neo-Kantian tradition of Helmholtz, Boltzmann 
and Hertz – to claim that what cannot be represented via a Bild in spacetime “cannot be understood at 
all” (quoted in Beller 1997, 427).   
Of course, after having granted that human beings are basically visual animals – since they 
extract most of the information on the external world through their eyes –, it would be too reductive to 
equate “understanding” a physical process with “visualizing it in space and time”. However, even if the 
FDs could not be regarded as a pictorial representation of a spatiotemporal process in the rigorous 
sense of the word, one could still defend the weaker claim that they could act as props to try to 
understand what happens in the physical world (Meynell 2008).  
Since we will discuss this claim in a later section, here it is appropriate to note there are at least 
two arguments against the claim that FDs can be regarded as pictures of the physical world in a strict 
sense. The first has been already advanced by Brown, who noted that as a consequence of the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, particles lack a well-defined spatiotemporal trajectory (Brown 1996). 
A difficulty with this criticism, however, is that it is interpretation-dependent, given that in Bohmian 
mechanics, for instance, particles always possess a definite position and velocity.  
A second, more technical difficulty against the view that FDs can be considered as pictorial 
representations of real physical processes in spacetime depends on some specific, practical aspects of 
the physicist's use of FDs. 
In fact, if we assign the |IN> state different particles, the same fundamental diagram can represent 
different physical processes, as it is possible to see in (FIG. 1). It is true that the two FDs have a 
different spatiotemporal orientation on the plane, but here the point is that the two FDs are structurally 
equivalent (in the sense that they are both composed by four straight lines connected by a wavy line, 
that is, both are composed by two vertexes). This means that the only difference between them is a 
difference in spatiotemporal orientation, since one can be interpreted as the result of the rotation of the 
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other. However, physics tells us that these two pictures are structurally the same in the essential sense 
that are invariant for rotations. Consider a map: if we rotate it of 90 degrees, the internal relations 
between the elements of the map remain the same. Yet, a particular FD regarded as a pictorial 
representation of a given physical process should differ from a FD representing another physical 
process.  
As an example, consider the first FD on the left, which represents a process of diffusion of 
electrons and protons, while the second FD on the right represents the annihilation of an electron and a 
positron with the creation of a pair of a fermion and an antifermion. The term √α in the diagram is the 
coupling constant, the γ is the propagator (identifiable with the exchange of a virtual particle), 1/q2 is 
the impulse transported by the photon, where q is the charge of the particle. In other words, this case 
shows how regarding FDs as representations of physical processes in spacetime would imply that 
different physical processes have the same representation. As we shall see later in this section, this is 
just one of the problems that a pictorial interpretation of FDs has to face. 
(FIG. 1) 
 
 
As a second argument, in order to appreciate the fact that the FDs are merely bookkeeping 
devices, we should stress their role in calculating scattering processes within the so-called Feynman's 
spacetime approach to quantum electrodynamics. If we consider an electron-electron scattering 
process, we will have a virtual photon propagating all over Minkowski spacetime, i.e. tracing all the 
possible paths that connect the first electron to the other electron. This propagation is represented by a 
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time-ordered product in the S-matrix. This virtual photon (Feynman's propagator) is assumed to be 
created at a spacetime point x1 and to be annihilated at a spacetime point x2. To calculate the S-matrix, 
one then needs to consider the contribution of all possible localized interactions of the Dirac fermionic 
and Maxwell bosonic fields, in the way in which they are connected by the virtual photon propagator. 
Technically speaking, one has to integrate over the probability amplitudes of all these possible paths.  
Moreover, it must be noted that the interaction that we are now describing results from the 
contribution of the propagation of the virtual photon from one electron and the other, and viceversa. 
Since FDs can be seen as a representation of a global spatiotemporal description of scattering processes 
all over Minkowski spacetime, how can this feature be understood as a picture of a real, localized 
physical process? In other words, “overall” means that we do not have a description of the interaction 
taking in a local region of spacetime, that is, we do not have an “in space” and “in (through) time” 
description of the interactions. A process, exactly as a particle, must be contained in a local region of 
spacetime!  
As a consequence, it is much more plausible to assume that a FD is just a “black box” that helps 
to calculate the complex function from an |IN> to an |OUT> state associated to a certain interaction. 
Given the conclusion of this section, we have to explain their allegedly “pictorial” role in the 
physics textbooks. This introduces the topic of the next section, which involves the heuristic role of the 
FDs. Kaiser (2000) for one regards FDs as conventions, but not chosen at random, since he argues that 
the way in which they are introduced and explained to physics students relies on a pedagogically useful 
comparison with Minkowski diagrams.7 However, while a painting need not be a representation of 
something else, namely a picture of something, the case of FDs is fundamentally different: what 
matters in our case is whether they are pictures of something, not that they can be used, either 
pedagogically or heuristically, as props for our imagination, or make-believe (see below). 
 
                                                            
7 In what follows, we will not venture into evaluating Kaiser’s interesting claim that the wrongheaded association of 
realism to FDs in 1950s and 1960s has been suggested by their similarity with the “real” photographs of “real” particles in 
the bubble chambers. 
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3. In what sense could FDs be taken to represent? Feynman diagrams as props of our 
imagination 
 
Even if we reject the claim that FDs are pictorial representations of physical process in the 
rigorous sense of “picture” specified above, the main problem to face when we ask the question 
whether and in what sense could FDs represent is our lack of understanding of a more general question, 
namely: What does it mean to claim that a physical theory represent or fails to represent the world? 
This difficulty has already been stressed by Walton, when he refers to “the confused profusion of 
senses and nonsenses” (Walton 1990, 3) in which the term “representation” is used. Depending on 
various philosophical positions on the nature of scientific representations, one gets different answers. 
And typically, even if we had a widely shared explication of the notion of scientific representation 
(which we don’t), the application of this general explication to two different physical theories may end 
up leaving us with different answers.  
In our case, not only is the issue of the representational power of FDs subject to the vagueness of 
the concept of “scientific representation”, but the problem is made even more complicated by the 
simple remark that FDs prima facie are not a physical theory of phenomena, in the sense in which, for 
instance QED is. If they were, one could try to claim that FDs are families of models of the quantum 
world that represent in some non-pictorial way the relevant phenomena, in the same sense in which 
physical theories in general represent.  
Neither can be of help the hypothesis that FDs are laws governing the interaction between 
electrons and photons or, more generally, other kinds of interactions, wherever this term applies. On 
the one hand, as hinted above, scatterings are certainly physical processes taking place in spacetime 
and coupling constants derive from physical theories. On the other hand, however, the issue whether 
the FDs are bookkeeping devices or something more cannot be resolved by trying to understand the 
nature of natural laws, since it is always possible to defend a view of laws that regards them as mere 
inference tickets.  
 Luckily here we can avoid these difficulties by focusing on the more circumscribed question 
whether the FDs represent in a sense that is weaker than the sense of “pictorial representation” already 
criticized in the preceding section, namely on Meynell’s interesting claim (2008) that FDs act or can 
act as props for the scientist’s imagination. This is the more general sense of representation that will be 
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referred to in what follows. However, in order both to defend our instrumentalist take on FDs and 
reinforce Brown’s view on the matter (1996), we need to specify in a clearer way the conditions under 
which it would be legitimate to claim, along with this author, that scientific representations in general 
(and FDs in particular) could act as a prop for our imagination. Let us refer to this weaker sense of 
picture as “quasi-picture”. Later we will defend an inferentialist view of the nature of scientific models, 
in which any representational role is avoided.It must be granted that there is a continuous transition 
between clear cases of pictorial representations and cases in which mere inkblots on a flat surface have 
no pictorial character whatsoever. Rothko’s paintings, for instance, belong to this latter case, but it 
seems to us that they would still count, on Meynell’s criterion, as a prop for our imagination or quasi-
pictures. Of course, we could see Rothko’s painting as …, but whatever 'we see as' risks being 
subjective or not intersubjectively shared. We all see the same profile of inkblots on a flat piece of 
paper, but what matters in Rorschach’s tests is what one see as, and this is why they are used as a test 
for personality traits. Meynell of course knows that if FDs were like Rorschach’s spots, we could not 
treat them as quasi-pictures of scientific representations, because they must prompt the same quasi-
picture or image to everybody. On the other hand, there are genuine pictures of non-existent objects 
(Santa Claus)8, and possibly all scientific models refer to fictional entities. However, this point would 
just reinforce the claim that FD do not pictorially represent local actual physical processes or matters of 
fact in spacetime. This is the conclusion that we are after. 
The charge of subjectivity of the representation force of “prop for the imagination” yielded by 
“quasi-pictures” – is strengthened by the fact that there is an important subjective element in the 
psychology of scientific imagination, given by the existence of  different styles of scientific thinking 
This fact is another piece of evidence in favor of an instrumentalistic view of FDs. Interviewed by the 
mathematician Jacques Hadamard, some mathematicians and physicists reported that they “rarely think 
in words at all”, but rather take advantage of visual and other kinds of mental images, often pictures.9 
Others, on the contrary, seem to rely on purely symbolic or linguistic ways of thinking. Interestingly, 
given what we know about his style of doing science, Dyson belong to the latter type of scientists while 
                                                            
8  This objection has been raised to us by Meynell in private correspondence. 
9  Einstein for once was aware of this difference, when in a letter to Hadamard he wrote “[t]he words of the language, as 
they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem 
to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced and 
combined. The above mentioned elements are, in my case of visual and some of a muscular type. Conventional words or 
other signs [presumably mathematical ones] have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when the 
associative play already referred to is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will.” (Hadamard 1945, 142-143, 
italics added).  
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Feynman to the former, something that could explain why they held different ideas about how the 
diagrams should interpreted and used. “From the very beginning, Feynman and Dyson held different 
ideas about how the diagrams should be drawn, interpreted, and used. For Feynman, doodling simple 
spacetime pictures preceded any attempts to derive or justify his new calculational scheme. To Dyson, 
the diagrams could be of any help only if they were first derived rigorously from a specific field-
theoretic basis. To Feynman, his new diagrams provided pictures of actual physical processes, and 
hence added an intuitive dimension beyond furnishing a simple mnemonic calculational device. To 
Dyson, the drawings were never more than ‘graphs on paper’, handy for manipulating long 
expression.” (Kaiser 2005, 175–176). 10 
Of course these biographical facts have no weight in evaluating the normative question we are 
trying to establish, but raise in any case three points that are rather important for the main claim of this 
paper.  
 
1. The first is that part of the philosophical discussion about whether FDs pictorially represent or 
not has its roots in the two main protagonists’ different imaginative or cognitive styles. However, the 
fact that some physicists (Feynman included) consider FDs as pictures or props for his imagination 
while other (Dyson included) do not prevents one from claiming that FDs represent as pictures, since 
whether something represents pictorially or not cannot just be a matter of different cognitive styles of 
reasoning. The other two points are more linked to our instrumentalistic stance.  
2. Pictorial or quasi-pictorial props for our imagination may play a role in inventing a physical 
theory or a new calculation tool (in the context of discovery), but since their justification and 
effectiveness lies in something else (theorems for instance, or precise predictions expressed in symbols 
within the context of justification), these images can only be considered as instrumental to suggesting 
the theory. As Kaiser has insisted, the act of baptism that led to the discovery of a certain technique in 
the context of discovery is not forgotten by later scientists, but becomes in some sense a consolidated 
way to present the theory even in the context of justification, even though this is compatible with the 
fact that the role of FDs is purely pedagogical. 
3. It seems to us that Meynell’s position does not completely avoid the risk of endorsing a purely 
subjective view of imagination, despite the fact that principles of generation of new hypotheses may 
possess some degree of intersubjectivity, given by the heuristic strategies that are typically used by 
                                                            
10 Feynman (1997), as he himself tells us in his Surely you are joking Mr. Feynman?, thought in pictorial images when, for 
example, he tried to prove visually a theorem that his colleagues mathematicians had proved in symbolic sequences. 
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scientists sharing the same paradigm. However, here we are not making general claims about normal 
science, but are rather discussing the specific case of FDs.  
Meynell could reply to our charge of subjectivity by drawing a distinction between “pictures” and 
“depictions” of phenomena. Consider the following quotation: “depiction differs [from pictures] in that 
it is through seeing the picture that we imagine ourselves seeing the pictured state of affairs” (Meynell 
2008, 50). This means that when we look at a FD, we imagine ourselves seeing the quantum 
phenomenon we are trying to describe, much in the sense described above by Einstein (see note 9)  and 
Feynman. But if our images are off target, FDs do not depict at all a real physical process.  
If we need a criterion of correctness for our imagination in order to claim that FDs represent as 
depictions or picture, we must disagree with the following claim: “the question of how and whether 
particular pictures denote is certainly an important question, but it is a different question to the question 
about how and whether marks on a surface – say, Feynman diagrams – pictorially represent.” It is a 
different question, but the most important question, it seems to us, is the former (i.e. a normative 
question that Meynell does not raise) and not the latter: if by looking at a FD we imagine ourselves 
seeing a true quantum phenomenon, how can we be sure that we are seeing something out there and not 
merely hallucinating? Imagination seems too weak a criterion for a pictorial representation in science, 
so that we are pushed toward a normative criterion that tells us that we are indeed depicting something 
and note merely imagining something that might not exist by relying on a picture that is a prop for our 
imagination. In a word, it is easy to claim that FDs are pictorial representations of physical processes if 
denotation of some sort is not taken to be necessary for a “depiction”.11  
Finally a reason to be skeptical about an objective pictorial component of FDs is given by the 
plausibility of the thesis that pictorial representations, and scientific representations in general, have an 
intentional component and a conventional element, that draws out attention to the context of use 
(Callender and Cohen 2006). “I use a picture M with the intention to represent P” is analogous to “I use 
the black ball that is about to collide with the red ball to represent a scattering of particles”, or even, “I 
use a salt shaker and a plate to represent the Moon orbiting the Earth”. This intentional component may 
well force one to conclude that whether or not FDs are pictures of something or not may depend on the 
particular use or aim at hand and therefore by the intention of the speaker. 
In other words, Meynell’s brilliant attempt to separate the question of representation from that of 
denotation faces some objections. In the case of a physical theory a pictorial or quasi-pictorial 
                                                            
11Meynell’s non-factive view of representation seems appropriate for art, but not for science.  
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representation must be a depiction of something beyond itself. That FDs can be props for a visual 
imagery is certainly important but we hope to have shown that this is at most a purely de facto, 
subjective and psychological phenomenon. As such, the amazing strength of FDs as calculational 
device capable of predicting with the utmost precision the magnetic moment of the electron, cannot 
depend on the fact that they are literally pictures of scattering processes or props for our imagination. In 
other words, a representational account of the FDs – in the sense of “representation” discussed above –
cannot be regarded as the best explanation of QED’s predictive success. 
 
4. A model-theoretical, inferentialistic view of representation of Feynman diagrams* 
 
If the notion of pictorial and quasi-pictorial representation cannot be a valid interpretation of the 
role of FDs in the context of quantum field theory and quantum electrodynamics, we would like to 
suggest a different, anti-representational perspective. Such a perspective which supports an 
instrumentalist view of FDs, relies on a particular understanding of the concept of scientific model, the 
inferentialistic one, that seems well-suited to account for the actual use of the diagrams on the part of 
physicists.12  
While we are well aware that, in general, a sociological fact is not sufficient to ground a 
normative, epistemological hypothesis, in our case a failure to take into account the concrete practice of 
physicists in their employment of the FDs is bound to fail. Therefore, our claim is not that we 
understand “model” better than  “representation”: the question on the nature of scientific models cannot 
be solved in the present context (see Frigg and Hartmann 2016 for an informed survey) and there is no 
universally shared position on the nature of scientific models. 
 
Our shift of attention on scientific models, however, is justified by the remark that one of the 
most interesting but neglected questions surrounding the FDs is, as suggested above, why they are so 
effective in predicting physical phenomena. It is well known that the prediction of the magnetic 
moment of the electron, if compared with the experimental data, is possibly the most precise every 
obtained in the history of physics. If this is the problem on which future research on FDs should 
concentrate, we suggest that the relationship between the mathematical model and the data model 
                                                            
12 Mattuck (1967) claimed that FDs have a quasi-physical nature, since they do not really represent something physical, but 
neither are they simple mathematical devices. This claim, which here cannot be evaluated, relies on a piecemeal 
approach to the question of scientific realism (Fine 1991), that partially inspires also this paper. 
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might prove crucial. The problem whether FDs can be regarded as mathematical models of 
experimental data would pose the issue of their relationship with the physical world under a different 
light. In this perspective, the main questions raised above would be translated into the following one: if 
the FDs were treated as mathematical models, in what sense could they denote the physical 
world?However, the predictive, algorithmic component of the FDs, as it results from the 
antirepresentationlist conclusion defended above as well as from the concrete practice of the physicists, 
seems to calls for some sort of denotation, deduction and interpretation model of the phenomena, of 
the kind defended by Hughes (DDI’s model). Denotation might be interpreted as the data models 
corresponding to |IN> state, the deduction part corresponds the algorithm used to calculate the element 
of the S-matrix via the help of FDs, and the FDs’ |OUT> state is Hughes’ interpretation stage. 
The following example is a simple but good illustration of our claim, and is taken from 
Feynman’s celebrated, popular book on QED, where he explains the conceptual roots of his approach 
to quantum field theory, essentially involving a sum over all amplitudes (1985, 26) (FIG. 2)  
 
  
                     0,3        0,4 
 
 
 
                 0,5 
     (FIG. 2) 
 
FIG. 2 is the mathematical model that is employed in our example. Let the arrows denoted by 0.3 
and 0.4 be the probabilities of a particular process (their amplitude). This corresponds to the process 
that Hughes calls denotation, the first step of his three-fold theory, which in our view implies 
embedding a property of the physical system in a mathematical, data model. 
The second step is purely inferential and deductive, since it consists in calculating the length of 
the diagonal and then squaring the number. This is the process that Hughes calls deduction, which is 
epistemically crucial in that it allows us to reason via the vehicle by using it as a “surrogate” for the 
actual physical systems (see also Suárez 2004). The mathematics used in this second step increases our 
information about the original system (Azzouni 2004) but, as claimed above, is devoid of realistic 
components. In Hughes words: “from the behavior of the model we can draw hypothetical conclusions 
  14 
about the world over and above the data we started with” (Hughes 1997, S331). 
The final step, which in a sense is the converse of the first, is interpreting the result (0,5), 
obtained via the algorithmic prescription, as the probability of the event we are interested in: this step 
transforms the information provided by the algorithm into something that can be subject to 
confirmation or disconfirmation.  
If we summarize the main points featuring in Hughes’ view of models as they are applied to our 
case via the example above, we easily realize that the link between the first and the third step listed 
below is purely inferential:  
 
1 Denote the |IN> or the probability of particular physical processes by the arrows (the 
mathematize data model ( → Denotation by a mathematical model ); 
2 Make the relevant calculations by summing the arrows in the appropriate way ( → Deduction 
via FDs ); 
3 Interpret the square of the diagonal of the arrows as the probability of the data/event we are 
interested in ( →  Interpretation of the end product of the calculation, namely the |OUT> ). 
 
Two important remarks are appropriate at this point. First, the conventional elements in the DDI 
model play an important role, since the choice of denoting a certain physical property by a certain 
component of a mathematical model (embedding via arrows, for example) is dictated by reasons of 
convenience and tractability of the calculations. Second, the DDI model functions in many scientific 
applications and, in our specific case study, it also is very appropriate to describe the role played by 
FDs in the physicists’ practice.  
One might want to put forward the point that the assumption that scattering processes are 
somehow correctly denoted – in Hughes’ sense – by the relevant FDs is the best explanation for their 
predictive success. This might be taken to imply that such diagrams model or denote, in some non-
pictorial but robust, structuralist way (in the sense of Da Costa and French’s 2003),13 concrete physical 
processes. In order to cast some doubts on realistic arguments of this sort, first of all we should notice 
that the FDs are not necessary to calculate the scattering of particles: without presupposing them, one 
can still calculate the scattering of the two particles via the integral of the particles; so in this case any 
sort of indispensability argument. Consequently, the empirical success of FDs cannot be explained by 
                                                            
13  These authors do not use FDs to illustrate their structuralist view of mathematical modelling of pysical phenomena. 
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an inference to the best explanation involving their structuralist or similarity-based (Giere 1988) 
features. In fact, the diagrams, as other bits of applied mathematics, in our case have been devised with 
the specific aim of calculating more exactly the magnetic moment of the electron and in general the 
interactions between matter and light: no wonder that they are so successful! Inferences appealing to 
the fact that many mathematical models of theoretical physics are successful in order to argue that all 
successful models (Feynman’s included) “depict” reality in a unique way – so that a uniquely 
describable representation relation stands out – are not convincing, because the algorithmic power of 
FDs may be completely independent of the real processes whose end result they enable us to calculate. 
In order to add some pragmatic component to our claim, we conclude by mentioning Suárez’s 
inferentialist account of models (2004), which is not specifically referred to FDs. His position, which is 
similar to Hughes’, focuses more specifically on the community of speakers that use a model in order 
(i) to grasp the physical process that they are describing and (ii) communicate their analysis in the 
clearest possible way. According to Suárez, a model is in fact mainly an instrument that lets cognitively 
informed agents draw inferences about the target, but its denoting and interpretive component is highly 
contextual. 
If sum, the best interpretation of the role of FDs in quantum field theory and quantum 
electrodynamics is captured by an account of their use via Hughes' DDI theory of models, where 
“models” are interpreted as inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given contexts by 
the particle physics community. 
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